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THE REQUISITES OF A VALID TENDER.
A TENDER in the law has been defined as an offer, made in pur-suance of some contract or obligation, to deliver something undersuch circumstances as to require no further act from the party making it to complete the transfer. The contract or obligation men-tioned may be either express or implied, and may, according to the
terms of the same and the circumstances surrounding the particular
transaction, render necessary the proffer either of a sum of money
or of specific articles. An act which would amount to a tender in
the proffer of money may not always be effective as such in the
attempted transfer of a chattel, yet there are certain general principles, applicable alike to tenders of money and of goods, which
have met with the approval of the courts through many years and
have become so well 'settled as to be frequently referred to as
text-book law. In considering these, the distinction between executed contracts and those of an executory nature must be kept
prominently before the mind, since the requisites of a tender are
not always the same in both instances. It should be also remembered that tender of a debt may be made only in cases where the
demand is of a pecuniary nature and is reduced or reducible to certainty; and in no instance where the claim is for unliquidated
damages. The effect of a tender, when made, is not to bar or
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extinguish the debt, but merely to prevent any claim for subsequent
damages or interest, and to entitle the defendant to judgment for
his costs: Chit. Cont., chap. v., sect. 8.
Among the general requisites of a tender may be stated first, the
rule that " an actual tender, unless rendered impossible or impracticable by the fault or negligence of the creditor, must be made in
all cases where a debt is due or a contract executed, and the party
to whom it is payable is entitled to it without the performance of
anything on his part, and the object of the-debtor is to discharge
himself from an action for it." And the same rule prevails where
one is bound to deliver goods, an actual offer must in all cases be
made; for, a mere readiness and willingness to perform an obligation of this nature will not be sufficient in tile law: Hfaldane v.
Johnson, 8 Exch. 689; Cranley v. Hillary, 2 M. & S. 120; Williams v. Bentley, 3 Casey 294 ; 1'ennsylvania Co. v. Dover, 14 P.
F. Smith 267; Littell v. Nichols, Hard. 66 ; Eastman v. Bapids,
21 Ia. 590; Cramp v. Simon, 34 Ala. 126; Steele v. Beggs, 22
fI1. 643; Sheredine v. Gaul; 2 Dall. 190. But where a contract
is to deliver goods "on request," the vendee need only aver a request and a readiness to pay the price, without showing that it was
.actually tendered: Bawson v. Johnson, 1 East 203. And even
Where a tender is necessary, it is sufficient for the debtor to show
that lie has made as ample a tender as was possible under the circumstances: White v. Hann, 26 Me. 361. Likewise, should an
-offer to pay money or an attempt to deliver goods be prevented or
rendered useless by the negligence or misconduct of the other party
the failure to make a tender will be excused. As where the plaintiff fails to comply with some of the conditions of the contract, such
as not being at.the place fixed upon at the time the contract is to
be performed (9 Bac. Abr. 331), or a creditor refuses to receive the
money (Dorsey v. Barbee,.6 Litt. 204), or designedly evades his
debtor and brings his action so soon that tender could not be made
before the commencehlent of the same: Gilmore v. Holt, 4 Pick.
259. And again, in the case of 'anexecutory contract, where the
acts to be done by the contracting parties are mutual and to be
performed at the same time, it is only necessary that the plaintiff
should aver that he has been ready and willing to perform his
part, to enable him to bring his action: 1 Chit. Plead. 326.
Secondly, every tender made in pursuance of an express contract must answer the requirements of the same by conformity
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thereto, in all the particulars of time, place, manner and the character of the thing to be transferred. With regard to the time of
tender, statutes have been passed in many of the states, providing
that in actions for the recovery of money, founded upon contract,
the debtor shall have the privilege of making a tender at any time
before trial in court, of the amount he admits to be due, together
with all costs accrued up to date of such tender; and compelling
the plaintiff, in case he do not recover more than the sum thus
tendered, to pay all costs subsequently incurred. But by the common law, if the defendant would avoid payment of costs and liability
to damages, it was requisite that tender be made in the very time
agreed upon, for a tender after the time was only allowed to go in
mitigation of the damages-and in no case could a tender be effective
if made after suit brought; although in a court of equity, a tender
with costs might be made after the bill had been filed: 21 James L,
ch. 16, sect. 5; Tillon v. Britton, 4 Halst. 120; _ishburne v.
Sanders, 1 Nott & MeC. 242; Hubbardv. The Bank, 8 Cowen 88;
Ripley v. 'Wardell, Caines 175. The reason for the strictness of
the rule that tender of a debt could not be made after the same bad
become due, arose mainly from the fact that the averment of "tout
tenps prist" was material in every plea of tender, and the debtor,
not having paid the claim upon the day of its falling due, could
not aver that he had been always ready: 9 Bac. Abr. 825 ; Ruston
v. Nobe, 4 J. J. Marsh. 130; Day v. Lafferty, 4 Ark. 450.
Where an obligation is to be performed by the delivery of chattels upon a certain day, a valid tender of the same can be made
only upon that day ; and the same rule prevails where the promise
is. in the alternative-that is, to pay a sum of money or deliver
certain goods. In both cases, if the day of performance be allowed
to pass without tender being made, the right of election ceases, and
the agreement becomes immediately absolute for the payment of
the amount of the consideration in money: Green v. Annon, Ilalst.
461; Chit. on Cont. 804; Roberts v. Beatty, 2 P. & W. (Pa.) 68;
Church v. Petterow, Id. 801. And where the condition of a bond
is that the obliger shall, at a day and place certain, "pay 20. or
deliver ten kine at the then choice of the obligee," a tender must
be made of both the money and the kine: Porkey's Case, 1 Leon.
68. Shouild the contract be for the payment of money or the
delivery of goods at a place certain upon or before a day mentioned,
the lawful period for a tender would be the uttermost convenient
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time of the last day, which is interpreted to mean an hour when
there is time enough left before sunset to count the money or examine the goods. For it is reasonable that there should be fixed
upon some particular time at which both parties may be at the
place designated; and since the debtor cannot be compelled to be
there to make his tender before this last hour of the period mentioned, it has been adjudged proper that the other party should not
be obliged to attend for the receiving of the money before that
time. But as this rule is established for the convenience of the
party to whom the payment or delivery is to be made, a tender at
any other time within the period limited will be good, should the
parties happen to meet at the place designated and an offer be
made: Allen v. Andrews, Cro. Eliz. 73; Plowd. 172; Co. Litt.
211; Tinkler v. Prentice, 4 Taunt. 554.
The place specified for performance of an obligation should likewise be observed in making a tender, unless the creditor choose to
accept payment elsewhere: Co. Litt. 210. But where no place is
designated, the circumstances connected'with each .case must be
regarded and a reasonable rule adopted. Thus where one is bound
to pay money on a day certain, he must seek the creditor wherever
he may be and make tender to him in person, unless he should be
out of the state at the time the debt becomes due, in which event
no tender will be required: Co. Litt. 210 b; Littell v. -Nicholl's
Adrn'r, Hard. 66 ; Aslshouse v. 1?avisay, 6 Whart. 331. In Smith
v. SmitI, 25 Wend. 405, it was decided that where, in a contract
for the sale of lands, no place is fixed for the payment of the purchase-money, a tender of the money and demand of a deed at the
residence of the vendor on the day appointed for execution of the
contract, is a sufficient compliance on the part of the purchaser to
give him a right of action against the vendor; and if the latter at
the time of such tender and demand is absent from home, a personal tender will not be required. The place for a tender of chattels where none has bedn fixed upon,*is ordinarily the residence of
the person to whom delivery is to be made: Grant v. Groshorn,
Hard. 85; Jacoby v. Scltwartzwelder, 1 Bibb 430 ; Galloway v.
Smith, Litt. Sel. Cas. 33. But circumstances may change this, as
where ponderous articles are to be delivered and no place has been
specified ; in such case it is incumbent upon the party whose duty
it is to make the tender, to seek the other person before the day
agreed upon and learn of him where he will have the articles
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delivered, and then, if a reasonable place be appointed, offer them
there: 9 Bac. Abr. 820; Barnes v. Graham, 4 Cowen 452.
With respect to the parties to a tender, the general rule is, that
it can only be made by the debtor himself or by his authorized
agent (MeDougal v. Dougherty, 11 Ga. 570 ; Crop v. faynbleton,
Cro. Elie. 48 ; 7ohnson, v. Smock, 1 N. J. L. 106), to the creditor
in person or to one to whom he has delegated authority for the purpose: Hornhy v. Cramer, 12 How. (N. Y.) rr. 490; Billet v.
Robinson, 18 La. Ann. 529 ; Hoyt v. Rymes, 11 Me. 475; leIniffe v. Wheelock, 1 Gray 600. Necessity and expediency, however, create frequent exceptions to this rule, and validity is sometimes given to a tender made by one who is an entire stranger to
a transaction. Thus it is stated by Lord CoKE (1 Inst. 206 b)
that any person may make a tender on behalf of an idiot, for the
law, on account of the absolute inability of such a person to act
for himself, allows this to be done out of charity. And in Brown
v. Dysinger, 1 Rawle 408, a tender of money was permitted to be
made by an uncle on behalf of an infant whose fitther was dead,
but whose mother was living, although the uncle had not been appointed guardian. A trustee or his personal representatives after
his death are the persons to whom tender should be made by one
indebted to a cestui que trust: Chahoonet al. v. Hollenback, 16 S. &
R. 425; and a tender of a deed to one of two joint purchasers
and a refusal by him is sufficient; no tender need be made to the
other also: Carman v. Pultz, 21 N. Y. 547 ; Dawson v. Bwing,
16 S. & R. 371.
In making a tender of money, the full and exact amount due
should be offered; for the tender of a less sum would clearly be
valueless: .Patnote v. Sanders, 41 Vt. 66; ftelphrey v. Railroad
go., 29 Ia. 480; Bakcr v. Gasque,. 3 Strob. (S. C.) 25; and
where a larger sum is offered, the creditor is not bound to receive
it, should the debtor demand change (6 Taunt. 886), although a tender of more than is due is perfectly good for the amount payable,
should not change be required for the balance: 9 Bac. Abr. 317;
Patterson v. Coxe, 25 Ind. 261. Even where change is asked,
should the creditor object to receiving the money offered on the
ground that he is entitled to more than the amount admitted to be
due, and not because he does not have the change at hand, the iender would be good: Cadman v. Lubboek, 5 D. & Ryl. 289.
When, however, a large sum is tendered, it is not necessary that
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the debtor pay or keep good the whole amount first offered; for,
although a tender of money in payment of a debt is evidence of the
amount due and is supposed to be an admission by the debtor that
the entire sum tendered is due and payable, yet it is not conclusive
evidence: Abel v. Opel, 24 Ind. 250. Though in a late case in
Pennsylvania, in which tender was made under Act of March 12th
1867 (Purd. Dig. 1395), after suit brought, and the amount supposed by defendant to be due the plaintiff was paid into court, it
was decided, that defendant, having by the act of tender admitted
the amount thereupon put into the hands of the court to be due,
this full amount must be paid over to plaintiff, notwithstanding the
fact that the award of the arbitrators in the case had shown that a
much less sum was really owing to him by defendant: Berkheimer
v. Geise et al., 82 Penna. St. 64. Should a telider be made after
the day of payment, it must include interest: .Hamarv. Dimmick,
14 Ind. 105.
To be sufficient, a tender must be so complete and perfect as to
vest the absolute property in the person to whom it is made: Schrader v. Wolfin, 21 Ind. 238; hence an offer of payment must be
unconditional and without reserve, for any attempt to attach a condition to a proposed payment or delivery will invalidate it as a tender. Thus, an offer of payment accompanied with a demand of a
receipt in full, or on condition of the sum tendered being received
as the whole balance due, is bad: TIayer v. Brackett, 12 Mass.
.450; Wagenblast v. McKean, 2 Grant 399. Yet a tender will not
be affected by there being affixed to it a condition on which the
debtor has a right to insist and to which the creditor could not
reasonably object: -Fheelock v. Tanner, 39 N. Y. 481. An illustration of this principle is presented in the case of an executory
contract, as where one party is to make a deed and the other is to
pay to him the purchase-money, an unconditional tender will not
be required on the part of the purchaser to enable him to bring
suit against the vendor for specific performance and execution of a
deed. In all cases of this kind, an offer to pay on condition of performance is sufficient, if performance is refused and the money is
brought into court at the time of trial: Henry v. Ilaiman, 25
Penna. St. 354. But, as before stated, it is.not enough in case of
an executed contract that the defendant was ready and willing, at
the proper time, to pay the money or deliver the goods. There
must be an actual attempt at delivery or an actual production and
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offer of the money: T1iwonas v. Evans, 10 East 101; Ladd v.
Patten, 1 Cranch C. C. 263; Walker v. Brown, 12 La. Ann.
266; Bowen v. Holley, 38 Vt. 574; Bakeman v. P-ooler,15 Wend.
637; which may, however, be dispensed with by the express declarations or some equivalent act of the creditor: Sands v. Lyon, 18
Cowen 18; Hazard v. Loring, 10 Cush. 267 ; Appleton v. Donaldson, 3 Penna. St. 8381; Strong v. Blake, 46 Barb. 227. But
a mere offer to pay, where it does not appear that the party had
the money ready, can not be made available as a tender. As was
said in Seawright v. Calbraith et al., 4 Dall. 303, where the necessity for the production of the money was dispensed with by the
creditor having demanded payment in specific kind of coin, "the
jury must be satisfied that, although the money was not produced
and counted, it was actually in possession of the party making the
tender." See also Fuller v. Little, 7 N. I. 535. Likewise, if a
tender is not made in good faith, it cannot be afterward taken advantage of: Fisk v. Holden, 17 Texas 408. If desirable to the
debtor, "he may make tender of the money in bags or purses, without showing or telling the same * * * and then it is the duty of
the party that is to receive it to put it out and count it: Co. Litt.
208 a;. Conway v. Case, 22 Ill. 127 ; Behaley v. -Hatch, 1 Miss.
369. And a tender will be valid, as such, though the creditor
refuses to remain until the money can be counted: lZain es v.
Jones, 4 Humph. 490. But where a creditor had called upon his
debtor to receive payment, and while he was counting the money
the debtor told him that his claim was extortionate, it was held that
he was justified in leaving the premises; and, though the money
was laid out before him, it was no tender: Harris v. Xluloek, 9
How. (N. Y.) Pr. 402. In some instances, the existence of a deposit in bank may, to all intents and purposes, amount to a tender.
As, where defendant kept funds in bank to meet a particular demand
payable-at that bank, but which was not presented for several months
after it became due, he prevented interest, the deposit being held
equivalent to a tender: Commonwealth v. Crevor, 3 Binn. 121.
Yet the mere having money in bank, sufficient to meet a note, will
not suliport a plea of tender unless the fund was in some way appropriated to such claim: 3Iyers v. Byington, 34 Ia. 205. And
should the money, in a case such as Commonwealth v. Crevor,
supra, be, at any time after the maturity of the demand, withdrawn
and used, the defendant would become liable for interest from that
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date, since even tendered money bears interest if subsequently used:
Miller v. Bank, 5 Whart. 505. This arises from the rule that
when a party has made a tender and expressed his readiness to perform his duty, he must from that time forth be always ready to do
so. Hence, if after having made a tender, the debtor refuses to pay
upon any subsequent demand for the same, he loses the benefit of
his tender (Town v. Trow, 16 Pick. 46; Rose v. Brown, Kirby
293; .Yatz v. Lober, 1 Day. 304; Stowe v. Russell, 36 Ill. 18 ;
Pulsifer v. Sheppard, 36 Id. 513 ; Call v. Scott, 4 Cal. 402), unless
his subsequent refusal should arise from something objectionable in
the action of the plaintiff, as where demand was made at an unseasonable hour, the defendant's refusal was not permitted to avoid the
effect of a tender made previously : Tucker v. Bu{ffumn, 16 Pick. 46.
It is further requisite, in order that a defendant may reap any
advantage from his tender, that he should plead it, with tout temps
prist (Wagenblast.v. licKean, supra), and upon the further plea
of uneore prist, bring the money into court: S/leredine v. Gaul,
supra; Miller v. Bank, supra; Mohn v. Stoner, 14 Ia. 115; 'Jarboe v. MeAtee, 7 B. 3on. 279; -DeWolf v. Long, 7 Ill. 679;
Clark v. Mullenix, 11 Ind. 532; Brock v. Jones, 16 Texas 461 ;
Mason. v. (roorn, 24 Ga.. 211; "Livingston v. Harrison, 2- E. D.
Smith (N. Y.) 197 ; Wing v. Rurlburst, 15 Vt. 607. In courts
of equity, however, this doctrine is much modified, and it is not
there required that the money be brought into court, but it is
regarded as sufficient if the respondent offers to bring the money
into court and expresses his readiness to comply with the direction
of the court in regard to it: Breitenbach v. Turner, 18 Wis. 140.
And it has been decided that the rule that a strict and unconditional tender followed by bringing the money into a court is necessaxy in order that the tender may be effective, has no application
to the tender required before an action for specific performance of
a contract for the sale of real estate: Fall v. Hazelrigg, 45 Ind.
476.
The.question as to what is a legal tender medium of exchange
has given rise to much dispute, not only in America but among all
civilized people. Most contracts are, with us, made payable in
"lawful money of the United States," and where liability to pay
is incurred and no particular mode of payment is specified, it is
understood that it shall be in such lawful money; hence we may
inquire what is "money ?" Lord CORE has derived the word from
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the Latin verb vnoneo, I advise, and says " moneta dicitura monendo,
not only because he that hath it is to be warned providently to use
it, but also because nota illa de authore et valore adnonet." Be
this as it may, the word money is now applied to anything used as
a convenient medium of exchange, and is a generic term, embracing every description of coin or bank notes recognised by common
consent as a representative of value in effecting exchanges of property or payment of debts: Hfopson v. Fountain, 5 Humph. 140.
Bank notes, however, have been variously looked upon by jurists,
some regarding them as money and others assigning to them a
character differing in but slight degree from the ordinary promissory note of an individual. Lord MANSFIELD, in 3Miller v. Raee,
1 Sm. Lead. Cas. 736, says of them, " They are not goods nor
securities nor documents for debts: but are treated as money, as
cash, in the ordinary course and transaction of business, by the
general consent of mankind, which gives them the credit and cur-'
rency of money to all intents and purposes; they are as much, money
as guineas themselves are, or any other coin that is used in common payments as money or cash ;" and the same principles were
recognised by Chief Justice GIBSON in Bayard v. Shunk, 1 W.'
& S. 92; see also Scruggs v. Gass, 8.Yerg. 175 ; Young v.
Adams, 6 Mass. 182. Nevertheless, an offer to pay bank notes in
liquidation of a general indebtedness has never been regarded as a
valid tender in the law: 9 Bac. Abr. 318 ; Cornell et al. v. G-een,
10 S. & R. 14; Donaldson v. Benton, 4 Dev. & Bat. (N. C.) L.
435; Jones v. Millenix, 25 Ia. 98. Though where bank notes
are offered in payment and no objection is made, at the time, on
that account, it is a good tender: 9 Bac. Abr. 319; IJ7llianis v.
Boor, 7 Mo. 556; Seawell v. Henry, 6 Ala. 226; Noe v. Hodges,
3 IHumph. 162; Brown v. Simmons, 44 N. H. 475; Show v.
Perry, 9-Pick. 539; and a tender in the notes of a bank, as between
the bank itself and its debtors, is equivalent to a tender in specie:
Bank v. Balliett, 8 W. & S. 311. A tender may also be made by
the offer of a check upon a bank, if the offer be not objected to on
that account and the check calls for enough money: Add. on Cont.

960.
The constitution of the United States has declared that "no
state shall make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts." The states are, therefore, debarred from impressing by special legislation upon the issues of the various banks or
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upon any bills issued by themselves the character of a legal tender
medium ; and a statute of Tennessee, making bank notes receivable
in payment of executions or in redeeming lands sold on execution,
was held to be unconstitutional and void, as violative of this provision : Lowry v. .1Ic hee, 8 Yerg. 242.
From what has been said, it may therefore be concluded that the
only thing in which an effective tender of a debt can be made,
whether the creditor choose to accept or refuse it, is the current coin
of the country in which it is offered, or a foreign coin, if made legal
tender by act of the legislature; Co. Litt. 207 b: Wade's Case, 5
Rep. 114. By Act of Congress of February 21st 1857, the law
previously in force making certain foreign coins a legal tender in
the United States was repealed; and it was thereby declared that
nothing but gold and silver coins of the United States and our
treasury notes should thereafter be such: 8 Brightly's Dig. 156,
sect. 41. The silver coins of denominations less than one dollar
(with the exception of the three cent pieces of the years 1851,
1852, 1853, which by acts of those dates were made a legal tender
in sums not exceeding thirty cents) remained, as they had been
since the Act of 1853, a legal tender to the amount of five dollars.
The silver dollar with the exception of the new trade dollar, which
is not a legal tender to any amount, gradually disappeared, it having been found that a profit could be realized by recoining them
into the smaller coins. But .all the silver coins coined prior to
June 1st 1853,-except the three cent pieces as above stated, remained a legal tender for their nominal value upon debts of any
amount; as did also the silver dollars coined subsequent to that
date, they having been excepted from the act. Finally, it was
declared by the Act of February 12th 1873, that no silver coins
should be a legal tender for debts exceeding-five dollars; and a
statute of the same date provided that the minor coins, consisting
of the nickle five, three and one cent pieces, should be a legal tender at their nominal values for any amount not exceeding twentyfive cents: Rev. Stat. of U. S. 712, sect. 3587. The old copper one cent piece is not and never was a legal tender to any
amount whatever. See late reply of the United States Treasurer
in answer to inquiries from the Post Office Department.
The Acts of. Congress of February 25th 1862 and March 3d
1863, making treasury notes or "greenbacks" "lawful money and
a legal tender in payment of all debts public and private * * *
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except for duties on imposts and interest on the public debt," were
by the Supreme Court of the United States in leplburn,v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603, held to be unconstitutional in so far as they
were claimed to apply to debts contracted before those acts were
passed; for it was said, the payments stipulated for by such contracts were either expressly or impliedly intended to be payments
in coin, that being at the time of their creation the only legal tender existing, and however Congress in the exercise of its supreme
legislative authority might prescribe a rule for future transactions,
the power to change existing contracts was nowhere in the constitution conceded to that body; and such a power could not be implied, being in its nature subversive of the very ends of governments, which are created to enforce and not to destroy the private
compacts of individuals, so long as they conform to existing laws.
But this decision was in the year 1870 overruled by the same
court, and it was then declared that the laws of Congress making.
these notes a legal tender were constitutionalwhether applied to
debts contracted before or after their enactment: -Knox v. Lee, 12
Wall. 457. The effect of which ruling is, that where the amount
due upon a general indebtedness is once ascertained, the courts
cannot recognise any difference between a gold dollar and a legal
tender note of that denomination: Bank v. Burton, 27 Ind. 426.
And, since the ultimate authority for the exposition of all Acts of
Congress rests in the Supreme Court of the United States, the
principle by it thus enunciated has guided the state courts in all
their subsequent rulings; it having been universally recognised
that the decisions of that high authority are, with regard to the
constitutionality of Acts of Congress, obligatory upon, and must
be followed by, state tribunals : Barringerv. Fisher,45 'Miss. 200 ;
Townsend v. Jennison, 44 Vt. 715 ; Bellock v. Davis, 38 Cal.
242; Smith v. Smith, 1 Thomp. & C. 63 ; Smith v. IYood, 37
Texas 616; Bankin v. Demott, 61 Penna. St. 264. Therefore,
in all cases where obligations, whether contracted before or after
the passage of the legal tender acts, were made payable in money
generally and not in any specified kind of money, they may be
paid dollar for dollar in legal tender notes: Savage v. Uniited
States, 8 Ct. of Cl. 545; People v. Cook, 44 Cal. 638; iygins v.
Bear .River Co., 27 Id. 153. And an offer to pay in "greenbacks"
the amount of a judgment rendered in 1858 was held to be a good
tender; since, upon a general indebtedness such as this, the judg-
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ment plaintiff could not refuse the treasury notes and demand payment in coin: Bowelt v Clark, 46 Ind. 405.
There are, however, many instances in which these notes are not
available in the discharge of liabilities, incurred both before and
since their creation. It has been decided that the legal tender acts
relate merely to the effect of the notes issued thereunder as a tender
in payment of debts arising on contract, but do inot forbid the
recognition in other relations of the difference between coin and
currency. While, therefore, a bond which is.
not made payable in
coin may be discharged in legal tender notes, yet in an action for
the conversion of this bond, it was permitted, in fixing the damages
to take into consideration the difference in value between gold and
currency, inasmuch as it had been shown that bonds of the company, by which the one converted was issued, were always paid in
gold: Simpkins v. Low, 54 N. Y. 179.
Likewise, as heretofore intimated, where the parties to a contract
have themselves stipulated for payment in a specific kind of money,
whether such stipulations were entered into before or after the passage of the legal tender acts, the difference between coin and currency must be recognised and payment enforced, if possible, in the
kind of money agreed upon; for the Acts of Congress do not
apply to contracts of this nature and they are lawful and apable
of enforcement.
This principle was enunciated several years ago
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Bronson v. Bodes,
7 Wall. 229, and Butler v. Horwitz, Id. 258. In the former. case,
a bond executed in 1851 was conditioned for the payment of a certain sum "in gold and silver coin, lawful money of the United
States, with interest also in coin ;" and it was held that this obligation was not discharged by a tender of th amount and interest in
legal tender notes. In Butler v. .Horwitz, a lease made in 1791,
reserved the refit "of 151., current money of Marylaind, payable
in English golden guineas."
The parties having agreed that 151.
was worth, at the time, of suit brought, $40 in gold and silver, and
the parties in possession under the lease having tendered, in payment of this amount, $40 in legal tender notes, it was decided that,
the leas9 required payment of rent by the delivery of a certain
amount of gold and silver, and that the damages must be assessed
at the sum agreed to be due, together with interest, in gold and
silver coin of the United States, and judgment was entered accordingly.

THE REQUISITES OF A VALID TENDER.

757

Commenting upon the result of the decision in these cases, AGNEw,
J., in tanlkin v. .Dernott, supra, says, '" The opinions of the chief
justice result in this, that after the passage of the legal tender
acts there were two descriptions of money in use, coin and notes,
both authorized by law and both made a legal tender in payments.
As a consequence, there being no express provision to the contrary
in the law, it is a just, if not a necessary, inference from the fact
that both descriptions of money were issued by the same government, that contracts to pay in either are equally sanctioned by law.
It was therefore held that express contracts to pay coin dollars can
only be satisfied by the payment of coin dollars. See also
Trebileock v. Wilson, 12 Wall. 687; .rank v. Calhoun, 59 Penna.
St. 381; Bowen v. Darby, 14 Fla. 202. In a case which arose
in the United States District Court, the doctrine above stated was
carried so far that it was decided that a contract, entered into since
the passage of the legal tender acts, in which payment was to be
made in the coin of another country, could only be discharged by
payment of so much gold and silver coin of the United States as
would equal the amount of foreign coin therein mentioned. Thus,
mortgages were given to secure payment of a note for 10001. sterling, and it was held that the intention of the parties was that the
sum thereby decured should be solvable only in gold coin, and that
the recovery, therefore, should be for so many dollars in gold and
silver coin, as were equivalent to 10001. sterling: 7ie Surplus, J.e.,
of the -Edith, 5 Benedict 144.
A seeming exception to the rule, that an offer of the kind of
money stipulated for in the contract can alone constitute a tender,
arises from necessity, where at the time the debt becomes due there
is no money of the country of the kind described in the instrument : in such case, the contract ceases to be one for money and
becomes a contract for a commodity, the value of which is to be
ascertained in any current legal tender money of the United
States. Just as in all other cases where there is a failure to
deliver specific chattels, the damages are assessed in current
money, taking as a basis of calculation the actual value of the
articles which were to have been delivered. A single case will
illustrate this. A ground-rent deed, of the date of 1794, reserved
the yearly rent of "thirty-two Spanish milled dollars" and, suit
having been brought for one year's rent, the court below gave
judgment for the exact number of dollars in the account; which
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was reversed by the Supreme Court and a judgment entered for
the amount that "thirty-two Spanish milled dollars" would be
worth in legal tender money of this country at the date of the
judgment. Hence an offer to pay that amount in legal tender
notes would be a sufficient tender: Christ CLurch Hospital v.
Ftueclsel, 4 P. F. Smith 73. See also, Mather v. Kinike, I
P. F. Smith 426; M41russelman v. Watts, 5 Phila. 51; Boric
v. Trott, 4 Id. 366. But where an instrument provides for the
payment of a certain number of dollars "in-silver money of the
United States, each dollar weighing 17 pwt. 6 gr. at least," it was
decided that this was not a contract for i commodity as in the
former case, although there are now no dollars of the United
States in existence of that description; but that it was a stipulation for the payment of coined money, and that the contract
having been made subsequent to the Act of Congress of 1849
which declares that a gold dollar should without regard to the
weight of the silver dollar be equal to it in value as a legal tender
upon all contracts, a tender of the amount in gold coin was sufficient: Alorrisv. Bancroft,1 Weekly Notes (Phila.) 223. And where
a written instrument calls for the payment of a definite sum at a
future time, to be made in current money of a certain metal, such
indebtedness can only be discharged by payment of the sum mentioned in such pieces of money as are, at the time the debt liecomes
due, a legal tender for the amount. Thus, a ground-rent deed of the
year 1806 reserved payment of the yearly sum of one hundred
dollars "current silver money of the United States." Suit was
brought in the year 1825 for one year's rent, and defendants made
affidavit that they had tendered the sum due in current silver coins
of the United States of the denomination of one dime each: it
was held, that this deed created an obligation;, not for the delivery
of a commodity, but for the payment of moncy; and if payment
was to be made in silver pieces, it was requisite that they should be
pieces of such current'silver money as would, at the time of the
tender, lawfully pay the amount of the rent reserved. Hence,
dimes not being a legal tender for more than five dollars, the offer
to pay one hundred dollars in pieces of that denomination, -could
not constitute a valid tender: Maule v. Siokes, 8 Weekly Notes
373.
J. I. LIND.
Philadelphia, Pa.

